Institutional entrepreneurship is typically portrayed in a positive light in the institutional theory literature, frequently symbolizing ideals of progress and innovation. In this paper, we explore a 'darker' side of institutional entrepreneurship by considering how the long-standing institutional practice of child labour was eliminated from the world's largest soccer ball manufacturing cluster in Sialkot, Pakistan. Our focus is upon the operation of power rather than the agency of the coalition of entrepreneurs. We show how power operated hegemonically in solving and reporting the issue of child labour in a way that deflected attention from 'darker' problematic aspects of this seemingly progressive and benign institutional reform. Consideration of these dynamics presents a challenge to conventional representations of institutional entrepreneurship and suggests the relevance of developing a more critical perspective when studying instances of institutional work.
Introduction
Within the institutional theory literature, accounts of institutional entrepreneurship have tended to depict and celebrate ideals of progress and innovation (e.g. Hargadon and Douglas 1999; Munir and Phillips 2005) . Institutional entrepreneurship is often seen to be the doing of actors who are able to mobilize resources to enable collective action. Through their astute identification of new opportunities, creative framing of issues (Garud et al. 2002) , and innovative processes of 'theorization' (Hinings and Greenwood 2002) , these institutional entrepreneurs are seen to infuse organizational fields with new, regenerative and innovative values and practices. Several studies have highlighted how the actions of institutional entrepreneurs may be questioned by field members (Hargadon and Douglas 1999; Rao et al. 2000) and that entrepreneurship is not always successful (Garud et al. 2002) . But seldom has sustained consideration been given to the less benign effects of institutional entrepreneurship that we term its 'dark side'.
To address this under-examined aspect of institutional entrepreneurship, we commend the relevance of ideas about power and, especially, its relation to knowledge -what Foucault (1977) terms power/knowledge. As our focus, we take an instance of institutional entrepreneurship that involved removing the 'taint' from soccer balls hand-sewn by child labour in Sialkot, Pakistan where 60-80% of the world's hand-stitched soccer balls are produced (Cummins 2000: 4, 27) . Specifically, we are interested in how the operation of power/ knowledge results in accounts of events in which certain aspects are rendered invisible as they are cast into shadow. This approach does not deny the value of conceiving of power in what Foucault would term a 'juridical' or actor-centric manner, so long as the latter does not entail displacing consideration of power's 'normalizing' effects. It is an approach that conceives of power relations operating to normalize the (self-evident) unacceptability of child labour and to veil knowledge of the consequences of its elimination. By making this conceptual shift in how power is 'seen', it is possible to better appreciate how issues such as the use of child labour are framed and the naturalization of such normalizing framings routinely protected from scrutiny. To highlight these dynamics, we invoke the metaphor of the 'velvet curtain' -something smooth and seemingly benign -that nonetheless can act to screen from awareness the operation of power in producing the conditions and consequences that tend to be excluded from analysis in which the focus is upon the activities of (powerful) institutional entrepreneurs.
The practice of child labour in Sialkot became a global issue following the broadcasting, on 6 April 1995, of a CBS news documentary on the soccer ball industry in Sialkot. The programme featured images of children stitching soccer balls in dark and dank one-room workshops. The CBS report was picked up by the other mass media in the USA (e.g. Schanberg 1996) and around the world. On 28 June 1996, a campaign known as the Foul Ball Campaign was launched to pressurize the soccer ball industry into remedial action. On 14 February 1997 in Atlanta, Georgia, at its annual trade show 'Super Show', the global soccer ball industry announced that it was launching a project to eliminate child labour from soccer ball manufacturing. The project -our example of 'institutional entrepreneurship' -unfolded over the next several years, orchestrated by the industry in collaboration with carefully selected civil society NGO partners. Through this process, the industry successfully positioned itself, in the eyes of the western media and consumers at least, as a constructive actor working to remove the bane of child labour while preserving the Sialkot soccer ball manufacturing cluster. The end of the project saw accolades being showered upon the participants in this 'exemplary' collaborative venture. That the benefits for children were questionable, and that the majority of women stitchers had to drop out of the workforce, plunging their families into deeper poverty, were details that went virtually unnoticed in all official narratives (Table 1 contains a chronology of salient events).
In the remainder of the paper, we outline our theoretical position, discuss our methods of data collection and analysis, present our case study of Organization Studies 28(07) de-institutionalizing children's involvement in the practice of stitching soccer balls and, finally, reflect upon some of its largely unreported and certainly uncelebrated consequences of 'knowledge' and 'best practice' transfer for stitchers and their families. We do not imagine that the darker, harmful consequences of our case of institutional entrepreneurship were intended; or that members of the collaborative venture actively conspired to conceal them from the media. Our point is that these effects are integral to our case of institutional entrepreneurship, which relied upon, operated through, and reproduced what may be characterized as naturalized, taken-for-granted relations of power. One of the first contributions to neo-institutionalist theory that directly raised the question of power argued, following Gouldner (1954) , that institutions have never 'developed and operated without the intervention of interested groups, groups which have different degrees of power'; and that the persistence of an institution is often the 'outcome of a contest between those who want it and those who do not ' (DiMaggio 1988: 12; see also DiMaggio and Powell 1991: 30) . There is much about processes of institutionalization, DiMaggio (1988: 3) argues, which 'cannot be explained without reference to interest and group conflict' [emphasis in original]. As Dacin et al. (2002: 47) Subsequent contributions to institutional theory that have not ignored power have adopted a similar, agency-centric conception of power to that sketched by DiMaggio (e.g. Brint and Karabel 1991; Greenwood and Hinings 1996; Fligstein 1997; Lawrence 1999) or have implicitly subscribed to it. For example, Maguire et al. (2004) represent their findings as 'illustrat(ing) the potential of actors to leverage a variety of forms of power', such as influence tactics, agenda setting and 'power embedded in social and technical systems ' (2004: 675-6 ). As with many other studies of institutional entrepreneurs, change is implicitly attributed to individuals or collective agents (e.g. Hensmans 2003) who are seen to engage in struggles that result in the establishment of a new institution and/or in the demise of established institutions. Our next task in this section is to set out our understanding of power, which, as we shall see, offers an alternative to, but is not dismissive of, the stance and approach favoured by DiMaggio (1988) and other neo-institutionalist theorists. Whereas this approach is widely regarded as the way to introduce power into institutionalist analysis, we regard it as a particular perspective on power and commend a less agency-centric alternative to it. In one of the fullest discussions of power in the field of organization studies, Clegg (1989: 90) comments that power remains an 'essentially contested concept'. If so, then power is perhaps best conceived, in its diverse formulations, as articulating competing politico-ethical projects and associated perspectives that render it meaningful and effectual in a variety of specific ways. At the heart of this approach is the rejection of the idea that 'power' has an essence to which different meanings or concepts of power more or less adequately correspond. Also rejected is any suggestion that different conceptions of power (e.g. 'episodic', 'dispositional', 'facilitative') can be sensibly combined like pieces of a jigsaw to produce a full(er) picture as, for example, is attempted in Clegg's (1989) Frameworks of Power. Instead, whatever meaning is attributed to the concept 'power', it is understood to articulate or 'perform' a particular politicoethical project (Dyrberg 1997) .
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This permits us to acknowledge that power may, for example, assume an actor-centric meaning that largely takes for granted what, from a different politicoethical standpoint, are identified as institutionalized power relations -such as patriarchy or postcolonialism. Accordingly, the focus of such actor-centric analysis is upon struggles between groups 'possess(ing) power to bring about the outcomes they desire' (Pfeffer 1981: 3) as they pursue their 'interests' within seemingly naturalized 'rules of the game'. But, by understanding of the diverse formulations of power as articulations of competing politico-ethical projects that endow it with a variety of meanings, conceptual space is opened up for analysis that pays attention to how power operates to normalize and naturalize certain values and practices. To the extent that such naturalization occurs, overt or even covert exercises of power by 'powerful agents' pursuing their 'interests' becomes unnecessary in order for established relations of domination to be (routinely) reproduced.
Quite often, differences of perspective and associated depictions of power are addressed and accommodated by suggesting that they capture different aspects, forms, faces, dimensions or levels of power (e.g. Lukes 1974; Fincham 1992) . Our position is not that such claims are wrong but, rather, that they each exemplify a dominant way of conceiving of power in which a realist ontology is combined with a rather unreflexive epistemology. The dominant conception of power -as having layers, aspects or dimensions that different approaches claim to more adequately capture or reflect -does undoubtedly produce valuable and challenging forms of analysis. Fincham (1992: 742) , for example, argues that studies that address what he identifies as the processual level of 'micro-politics' and 'decision-making' ignore another level where 'forms of power' are 'derived from structures of class and ownership … and of increasing interest lately the normative structure of gender ' (1992: 742) . Irrespective of whether one favours analyses that study power in terms of the existence of 'structures of class and ownership', 'gender' (or ethnicity or postcolonialism, etc.), or analyses that attend to power as the micro-politics of decision-making where such 'structural' considerations are excluded, our emphasis here is upon recalling their shared, perspectival and performative status. For us, their effect, but not necessarily their intention or self-understanding, is to construct the world (as 'micro-politics' or the reproduction of structures and class and ownership), not to capture it.
Formulated in this way, the concept of power is understood to be performative as it participates in articulating particular perspectives that construct/depict the social world in distinctive power/knowledge frameworks. It follows that the key to understanding 'power' does not reside in the identification of some aspect or dimension of the world that a defensible account of power is assessed to reflect, but, instead, resides in the critical appreciation of the effects of the conceptions of 'power' articulated by different politico-ethical projects and associated perspectives that are productive of its significance and its study. Indeed, the widespread treatment of the study of power as an epistemological question -exemplified by the suggestion that, for example, our knowledge of power is incomplete unless we adopt a methodology that pays adequate attention to one or other of the 'levels' (Fincham 1992) or 'dimensions' (Lukes 1974) is, from this perspective, disingenuous. For it is seen to involve a political manoeuvre, widely normalized among social scientists, in which epistemological arguments about the objectivity of a particular account of power are invoked to purify, and thereby advance, particular politico-ethical positions -for example, by counting 'class' or 'gender' out of, or into, studies of power.
The identification and study of power as 'micro-politics' or as 'class', 'gender', etc. is, from this perspective, interpreted primarily as articulating a politico-ethical commitment rationalized as an epistemological stance. In this respect, our position resonates with Foucault's (1977) view that knowledge and power do not exist in a relation of externality to each other:
'there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose or constitute at the same time power relations … it is not the activity of the subject of knowledge that produces a corpus of knowledge, useful or resistant to power, but power/knowledge, the processes and struggles that traverse it and of which it is made up, that determines the forms and possible domains of knowledge.' (Foucault 1977: 27-28) Foucault draws us towards analysis that endeavours to appreciate the effects of particular discourses with regard to how they articulate and sustain a 'regime of truth' such that a particular 'object of discourse', or social objectivity, is effectively institutionalized. His reflections on power/knowledge also alert us to how a conception of power that diverges from an established, agency-centric or subject-centred notion of power will likely generate some 'resistance' from analysts of institutional entrepreneurship, for example, who assume power to have an essential meaning and/or regard analysis guided by an alternative conception of power as a threat. Thus, our study of Sialkot ball stitchers could be interpreted as a threat to an account in which the successful de-institutionalization of child labour in soccer ball manufacture is shown to be undertaken by a coalition of institutional entrepreneurs whose leverage of their capital involved numerous forms of power, including, for example, the 'persuasion, ingratiation, and social proof' (Maguire et al. 2004: 676) , required to obtain the involvement of NGOs. Our concern here is not to take issue with such an approach but, rather, to note that conceiving of power as a possession of entrepreneurs who pursue 'interests' produces accounts that are markedly different from those in which change is represented in terms of, say, power-infused relations of 'class' 'gender' and/or postcolonialism. Our point is not to argue that power is 'really' all about 'class', etc. or that it is not 'truly' about conflicts of interest between groups of actors -such as the companies and the NGOs, or the NGOs and the ball stitchers. Our position is one of agnosticism in relation to the ontology of power. We are sceptical of the possibility of identifying and studying the essence of power. But, our agnosticism also makes it impossible for us to argue that power does not exist in any of the forms attributed to it by alternative power/knowledge frameworks. What our agnosticism permits us to say is that 'power' is conceptualized in diverse ways; and that these conceptualizations are associated with significant and differing politico-ethical effects in terms of what is represented. For these reasons, 'power' presents an important area of theoretical debate as well as empirical study. It might then be asked: why favour any particular conception of power when any one would seem to be as good as any other? Our response is that the value of the concept of power favoured in our analysis, in contrast to a more actor-centric approach, is that it points to the limits of established, institutionalist analyses of 'entrepreneurship', where a focus upon the 'agency' and 'interests' of key actors tends to cast into shadow (unacknowledged) conditions as well as (unintended) consequences of the 'power' that is attributed to them. These limits, we have suggested, are not epistemological, but political.
Methods Research Site: Sialkot Soccer Ball Industry
The majority of the world's soccer balls have, for decades, been produced in Sialkot, Pakistan, with leading international brands (e.g. Nike and Adidas) sourcing almost exclusively from Sialkot. Estimates of the number of stitchers employed in Sialkot's soccer ball manufacturing cluster varied from a low of just over 30,000 (International Monitoring Association for Child Labour (IMAC) 2003) to a high of 65,000 (Awan 1996: 5) . Ambiguity also surrounded the number of women who were part of the stitching workforce. Estimates varied from 30% to 58% of the total stitching workforce (Save the Children 2000a; IMAC 2003) . The remainder were divided almost equally among adult male stitchers and children. It was similarly difficult to be precise about the number of children -the great majority of children helped their parents at home, who were in turn paid for the number of soccer balls rather than hours worked -an ILO estimate placing the number of children at approximately 15,000 (Husselbee 2001: 133; ILO 1999) . What was beyond doubt, however, was the fact that most of these balls were stitched in homes (mostly in the 1,600 odd villages surrounding Sialkot), where they were taken by an elaborate chain of subcontractors.
Data Collection and Analysis
Main sources of data were interviews and documents. Between November 2000 and October 2003 , the first author (FA from hereon) made three extended field trips to Sialkot, Pakistan. The first was a pilot study that included observations, and interviews with NGO personnel, industry executives, and a soccer-ball stitching family. During this visit, it became obvious that negative consequences affecting the poor, stitching families of Sialkot were not being reported in the media or in the child labour project or corporate reporting.
In the next two field trips, 60 interview sessions were conducted with staff of NGOs working on the child labour project to eliminate child labour, and male and female soccer ball stitchers as well as children affected by the Atlanta Project. Each interview was semi-structured and lasted on average about 80 minutes. The longest was about three hours. A total of a 110 respondents participated in the interviews, with 50 of them being women stitchers.
In order to get access to the stitchers, the FA had to build considerable rapport with staff working for various project organizations. Once rapport was developed, the FA was able to connect with key individuals who introduced him to the stitching community and subcontractors (i.e. individuals who supply soccer balls for stitching to stitchers and earn commission per ball stitched from soccer ball manufacturers). The acquaintances made in such ways were instrumental in achieving access to the female stitching community, access to whom was difficult, given traditional Islamic values of modesty and gender segregation, as well as the male stitchers, most of whom spoke only when a trusted intermediary was present, often away from their stitching centres. Stitchers were asked about the child labour project, their working conditions and their concerns and issues. At the close of each interview, stitchers were asked questions about exercising agency (voice) and any constraints experienced in doing so. NGO personnel were asked about the visible absence of stitchers' voices in the design and implementation of the project.
Apart from interviews, several other sources of information were used, including newspaper stories, internal organizational documents (emails, faxes, memos, letters, project evaluation reports, meeting minutes), US Department of Labor (DOL) hearings, legal archives, public fact-finding reports, internet documents, and surveys published by the child labour project organizations. In total, this comprised 10,000 text pages. It was supplemented by video documentaries about Sialkot child labour issues, and a quantitative database of an NGO with basic demographic information on 2,000 stitching families.
As part of the analysis, a diary was kept both to document the history of the project and to develop theory categories. Documents were catalogued and annotated for retrieval using EndNote bibliography software. The documents were placed in filing cabinets with corresponding catalogue numbers. The aim of the analysis was to contrast the perspectives of the project organizations and the media with the accounts told by members of stitching families. The intertextuality of documents and interviews allowed for corroboration of threads (or themes) across storied accounts among multiple sources. This was done in an iterative fashion, comparing what stitchers were saying against the other accounts. The narrative of the case study and its findings emerged through this complex data collection and analysis process that straddles gender, class and cultural cleavages.
Power and Institutional Entrepreneurship Production of a Crisis
Prior to the airing of a short CBS documentary in April 1995 on the soccer ball industry in Sialkot called Children at Work (CBS transcripts, obtained in 2003) , it is doubtful whether many users of hand-stitched soccer balls had much of an idea where, let alone how, their balls were made. The CBS programme, which was rapidly picked up by the other mass media both in the USA and around the world, forcefully brought to the fore the unsettling picture of poor children working so that American kids could play soccer.
The CBS documentary is an exemplar of what, following Foucault, we earlier characterized as power/knowledge. Even in the longest documentary imaginable, it would be impossible to present a full picture of the case -not because of lack of resources, but because of disagreements over what should be included, given emphasis, etc., in order to produce 'fullness' -and then what we can term 'power' operates continuously to overcome 'undecidabilities' about what knowledge of Sialkot to construct and present. CBS journalists were empowered, in this sense, to produce a documentary whose ostensibly factual content -with regard, for example, to allegations that children earn less than adults -was based upon the dubious testimony of the interpreter hired in the CBS documentary, who was not a native of Sialkot and who had no experience of the soccer ball industry.
That the account presented in the documentary was contestable was subsequently underlined by the findings of a report published later in the year by the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP 1995) . This report agreed with the documentary makers on the issue of the wages paid to stitchers being exploitative, but refuted many of the other charges, which included allegations of the prevalence of bonded child labour, workplace beatings, children working predominately in workshops for long hours, and differential wages for children and adults. The findings of the HRCP report were further supported by evidence on Sialkot's soccer ball industry published prior to the crisis (e.g. Weiss 1991) and later by numerous studies and surveys undertaken by other independent organizations such as international NGOs (e.g. Save the Children and ILO), international trade unions and their Pakistani affiliates (e.g. International Confederation of Free Trade Unions and All Pakistan Federation of Labour) and local organizations (e.g. Raasta Development Consultants). Of course, this does not in any sense 'prove' that the CBS report was erroneous, as these other organizations also constructed their accounts within specific power/knowledge frameworks. So, our point is not to dismiss the contents of the CBS documentary but, rather, to note that no reference was made to the earlier research findings in the programme, and no subsequent correction or apology was issued in the light of findings of other studies and surveys. In general, whereas the documentary had a major impact in the construction of reality -for both the consumers of the documentary and the soccer balls as well as for the stitchersknowledge contained in the other studies and reports had negligible effects.
Removing the Stigma: A Coalition of 'Institutional Entrepreneurs'
Irrespective of its veracity or otherwise, the CBS documentary and subsequent media coverage produced a major reaction and a response from the US government. On 28 June 1996, with official endorsement of the US Department of Labor and prominent politicians (e.g. Senator Joseph Kennedy II), a campaign was launched to bring an end to child labour in the soccer ball industry. The 'Foul Ball Campaign' was coordinated by the International Labor Rights Fund (a Washington-based labour advocacy group) in cooperation with a network of labour, consumer, religious, sports, and child advocacy groups (US Department of Labor 2003) . The campaign called on everyone from youth soccer leagues to school administrations to put pressure upon industry to stop using children in the production of soccer balls.
What, then, of the soccer ball industry? It responded by first expressing indignation at learning of child labour involvement (Moore 1996 ; US Department of Labor 1996) and then quickly formed a coalition of international sporting goods Khan et al.: A Dark Side of Institutional Entrepreneurship industry associations, notably SICA (Soccer Ball Industry Council of America) and WFSGI (World Federation Sporting Goods Industry) who were representing the interests of their members (i.e. international brands), and Sialkot-based suppliers represented by the Sialkot Chamber of Commerce and Industry (SCCI). To further legitimize the coalition, the industry associations involved UNICEF, ILO and Save the Children in their campaign to remove the taint of child labour from goods embossed with the (value-adding) prestigious logos of top western sports companies.
The project was announced in February 1997 and implementation began in October 1997 (ILO 1997 . Child labour was to be phased out by shifting the stitching of balls, the activity in which children were involved, to monitorable stitching centres (ILO 1997) . The stitching centres are factories or workshops that, unlike village homes, could be more readily accessed by ILO monitors in order to verify that no children were involved in stitching soccer balls. The project also incorporated a social protection programme. Its purpose was to take care of the displaced child stitchers and their affected families by creating alternative income opportunities, largely through micro-credit schemes and vocational training, e.g. tailoring (Crawford 2001) . Education of children was to be provided either by enrolling them in government schools or setting up one-to three-room education centres where they would be educated up to grade 5 on a few hours a day basis (Save the Children 2000b; ILO-IPEC 1999; Bunyad Literacy Community Council 1998).
Addressing the Problem?
As far as the industry was concerned, the issue at Sialkot was self-evidently one of child labour, as identified by the CBS documentary, and not part of a broader issue about fair wage rates, let alone about other considerations such as gender or postcolonialism. The industry made no apologies for the past treatment of children. Allusions by industry spokespeople to child labour at the time of the Atlanta Agreement never acknowledged its long-standing participation in its accommodation of this practice. Child labour was attributed to vague and unfathomable traditions, which, like a mystery virus, had afflicted the whole soccer ball industry. Now that it had been identified, the industry was going to develop and administer the vaccine that could eliminate this disreputable practice. The crusade to eliminate child poverty was mounted with a moral probity and self-righteous passion, as is illustrated by the WFSGI President, Stephen Rubin's, presentation at the Atlanta Agreement's press conference:
'The soccer community has asked for reassurance that child labour has no place in producing the soccer balls used in neighbourhood sandlots or national stadiums. This new partnership is an unprecedented response to that concern. For the first time ever -in any industry, in any part of the world -local manufacturers, global brands and internationally respected children's organizations have agreed to work together to address child labour in a responsible manner.' (Cited in PR Newswire 1997) Noticeably and ironically absent in the conference were the people at the heart of the crisis and for whose benefit the announcements were being heralded: the Sialkot stitcher families. The stitchers lacked access to legal/political, cultural and economic resources; and, to our knowledge, no attempt was made by NGOs, for example, to attenuate this situation. The 'foreigners' could fly into Sialkot but representatives of the stitchers could not readily travel to the ILO offices in Geneva to convey their concerns and grievances. Communications were conducted in English and little or no effort was made to inform the stitchers of the international controversy and the nature of the response being prepared. Lacking any kind of capital, symbolic or material, the illiterate stitchers were handicapped in gaining access to, let alone becoming involved in, agenda-setting processes and negotiations over their fate. Their concerns could, at best, be communicated to NGO representatives, who were bound by guidelines for representing the problem of child labour and the solutions that were being implemented, and therefore faced sanctions if they deviated too much from the official line and accompanying narrative.
It was perhaps taken for granted that child stitchers would be grateful for being rescued from the scourge of child labour. If so, this assumption could certainly have been challenged, as had happened when child labourers were invited to participate in a conference on child labour held in Amsterdam later in 1997. Contrary to the organizers' expectations, the children cogently said that work provided them with dignity and a sense of soldiering solidarity with their household, by helping to bear its cost of living (Swift 1997) . What they wanted was not the abolition of child labour, but a living wage and other workplace rights (Swift 1997) . The response to this 'inconvenient fact' was to ensure the complete marginalization of child labourers in subsequent conference proceedings.
In this way, issues of the industry's involvement in perpetuating impoverishment (e.g. not paying a living wage to stitchers and being more concerned with the quality of the gloss on soccer balls than the malnourished pallor of the faces of the stitchers that made them) were unacknowledged or excluded from awareness. In effect, the historical circumstances that have led to the production of soccer balls in Pakistan in impoverished circumstances were, if unintentionally, obfuscated. Robert Reich, Secretary of Labor and a key sponsor of the child labour elimination campaign, framed the issue in exclusively legal terms as one that is separate from wages -an issue of a failure to comply with the law, not one about the justice of poverty wages, and therefore a responsibility of nation states, not of (US-owned) companies:
'I want to emphasize that these conditions [of child labour] violate international law. This is not an issue that one can simply attribute to the poverty of a particular nation. Unlike wages or certain working conditions, the employment of very young children is a fundamental breach of international law. It is something that almost every nation has laws against. It is bad for even a developing nation because those young children need to be in school if that nation is to develop ... This is a basic human right. The International Labour Organization has international treaties these nations have subscribed to. This is different from developing standards such as wages, which do rise as a nation can afford them.' (US Department of Labor 1996) .
While speeches of this kind affirmed the established narrative about Sialkot, important political work was also being undertaken backstage, away from the media spotlight. Efforts were being made to decouple the issue of fair wages from the child labour problem and to suppress or scuttle efforts that tried to Khan et al.: A Dark Side of Institutional Entrepreneurship make the connection. For example, a FIFA code requiring soccer ball manufacturers to pay fair wages was, according to ICFTU (International Confederation of Free Trade Unions), effectively sabotaged by WFSGI, an allegation that was subsequently corroborated by WFSGI itself (Gorgemans 1997: 7) . The ILO brought together a coalition that included UNICEF and SCF but excluded organizations that were more likely to raise controversial issues (e.g. payment of a 'fair' wage), such as the International Labour Rights Fund (ILRF), one of the original campaigners against child labour (Riddle 1997) .
There was not always complete consensus on who should be part of the coalition. The Sialkot-based suppliers, for instance, were apprehensive about ILO's inclusion, given its institutional linkages with organized labour. They had no way of knowing whether the ILO would extend its attentions to other labour rights issues, such as organizing workers into independent unions. To convince them of ILO's probity, the international industry associations helped organize a mission for the Sialkot manufacturers to visit ILO's child labour removal work in Bangladesh in May 1997. When the delegation returned from Bangladesh, the following conclusion was reached: The composition of the coalition is suggestive of the priorities of UNICEF and NGOs like ILO and Save the Children, which commanded much respect in the West. In Sialkot, in contrast, these were not priorities and these organizations were viewed with suspicion, if not hostility. The NGOs quickly realized this difference, as is illustrated in the following quote in which an NGO official recollects a village visit:
'Early on our car windows broke. We were surrounded by angry mob in our car for several hours with a Canadian making [a] movie. Initially some foreigner had come and made a movie. When work stopped, [villagers] felt that movie had stopped work. Bringing bad name to village. After that, for some time using police protection.
[Villagers] accused us of taking bribes ... Found out films are going abroad and then work is stopping. ' We do not deny that agencies, such as the industry federation and the NGOs as well as the stitchers, were involved in addressing the issue. But what is far more revealing is how this issue was framed and addressed in a way that took it for granted that child labour rather than, say, poverty wages was the key issue. It appears that the framing of the issue as child labour -by the CBS documentary makers as well as by the companies, etc. -was not necessarily a matter of deliberate choice by the film producers, the soccer ball companies or the NGOs. Rather, power operated in a way so as to render this framing self-evidently true, simply by passively dis-attending to the sense and significance of any alternative framing -even to the point of having no idea that the overwhelming majority of the stitchers, including their children, were vehemently opposed to Organization Studies 28 (07) the removal of child labour.
A Success Story?
By September 2003, according to the ILO, 95% of all Sialkot exports were being made without the use of child labour (IMAC 2003) . The industry was effectively child labour free. A new production regime had been established where stitching was moved from homes -inaccessible to outsiders in the deeply rural and conservative culture of Pakistan -to monitorable stitching centres, so that the scandalous taint of child labour could no longer be hidden within the privacy of people's homes. However, this version of events, with its unequivocally rosy conclusion, pays no attention to the wider effects of the institutional entrepreneurship that eliminated child labour from Sialkot. By abstracting the practice of child labour from its wider cultural context, no consideration is given to the wider ramifications of the change and, more specifically, its consequences for women stitchers.
Stitching was one of the lowest-paid jobs in Sialkot's industry and is generally seen as a low-status activity. Indeed, given a choice, perhaps all women would opt for some other life and work. This was made clear to us, for instance, by a female stitcher who asked: 'Why do you want to study our problems? Are you trying to keep us in stitching? Will your research perpetuate our work in stitching? We want to leave stitching and do alternative work.' In the absence of other opportunities, economic necessity dictated that these women continue stitching. A door-to-door survey of 403 stitchers, of whom a majority were women (56.4%), was undertaken at the time by a matron employed by a leading soccer ball firm. It concluded:
'I was informed that help with educational expenditure and medical care was the most pressing need, followed by others such as: repair work to their homes damaged during the rainy season, dowry for the girls when they get married, toilets, a pump, fans, electricity meter.' (Khawaja 2002: 2) The burning issue for women stitchers was a living wage, as this made possible the provision of life's basic necessities. Surveys conducted on stitchers, both men and women, from 1997 onwards, confirm this assessment.
The project lacked relevance and legitimacy in the eyes of the stitchers, including the children, because it did not cater directly to these priorities. Instead, a trickle-down approach was deployed, using micro-credit, school enrolment drives and informal education centres, which missed the majority of the women stitchers and their families (Crawford 2001) . Moreover, it appeared that few, if any, of the trickle-down social protection programmes were sustainable. For example, less than 30% of the families that received micro-credit, disbursed under the project, were stitching families (Crawford 2001: 16) . Likewise, the education centres had begun to be wound up by 2004, so their impact, while beneficial for the few families who came into their safety nets, was, at best, shortlived, and the lot of women, in particular, deteriorated as a consequence of the establishment of monitorable stitching centres that enabled the International Labour Organization (ILO) to check that children were not stitching.
A study by SCF (2000a) in 12 villages that have a concentration of stitching Khan et al.: A Dark Side of Institutional Entrepreneurship activity, in which 3,210 households were interviewed, explicitly highlighted that a) stitchers detested the discipline of factory time where they had to work according to fixed hours, as opposed to the previous system of flexible working hours; b) they felt that commuting to and from the stitching centre was an unproductive waste of their time; c) for many, who had stitched only part-time to supplement income derived from agricultural work, there was no alternative to taking up stitching full-time, thus losing income from agriculture; and d) the output in stitching centres was lower because the soccer balls completed by stitchers had to be approved before they could start on a new ball. Of the 50 women interviewed for this study, only two expressed a preference for working in stitching centres. The overwhelming view expressed by women was that they stitched fewer balls at the centre than at home because, in the centres, they could only stitch during the hours they attended the centres whereas, at home, there was no limit. Even with household chores, they could use the night-time to stitch balls and end up with a higher production rate than at the centres. It might be contended that this was self-exploitation that extended to families' exploitation of their children to produce balls rather than attend school to gain an education and related opportunities to escape poverty. Such possibilities, however, depend upon the availability of, and access to, such resources (see above) as well as a level of income sufficient to spare children from involvement in contributing to a minimal subsistence income. In addition to the convenience, productivity and efficiency benefits of stitching at home, women also emphasized the importance of their dignity. By working at home, women were able to avoid revealing themselves (publicly) as soccer ball stitchers and thus escape slurs and derogatory comments from fellow villagers. A woman stitcher, nostalgic about home-based stitching, sighed, 'Before, you could earn with respect at home.' Respect is important for women, and the visible daily commute to centres exposes their self-respect to scathing verbal assaults by villagers, particularly men. Another woman stitcher, despite her precarious economic situation, left working in centres because she could no longer tolerate such abuse. In words laced with deep hurt, she recollects her centre stitching experience as follows: Home-based stitching not only saved women from verbal abuse, but also from possible physical or sexual abuse, which was sometimes reported at stitching centres. So, the replacement of home-based stitching by stitching centres came at a heavy but unrecorded cost to those least able to afford it: the stitching families. Unsurprisingly, only around 20% of the pre-project women stitching workforce made the migration to stitching centres, whether in their own villages or in remote locations.
With women's withdrawal from the workforce, wage rates initially increased for male stitchers at centres. However, they were not enough to compensate for the loss of income suffered by women and children now unable to stitch. According to IMAC, in July 2003, there were just over Organization Studies 28(07) 3,200 female stitchers left in the workforce, down from initial estimates of between 12,000 and 18,000. Inevitably, household incomes fell in absolute terms.
The misery was compounded by a concurrent shift in the composition of the Sialkot soccer ball supply. China was making inroads into lower-quality balls that usually had been stitched by women, while Sialkot concentrated more on higher match-quality balls (Cummins 2001) so that less labour overall was required, which has made it increasingly difficult for women to obtain work outside of the centres. Those who refused to work in the centres found themselves competing against each other for the diminishing volume of work that was being undertaken outside of the centres, as a woman stitcher described:
'Wages are poor. We have children. Work hard to earn bread. We get money on times [from subcontractor] sometimes. Ten years [I have been] stitching. If I protest, there are 1,000 people willing to stitch. [Subcontractor will] say fine. You do not want to work, [I will] give it to others.'
Another woman stitcher described the drastic drop in orders in the following way: 'Before, we used to get two balls, now get one ball. If, before, we get one ball, now make half. ' All this happened while the project received international accolades for its humanitarian concerns and the US presidential seal of approval:
'Let me cite just one example of the success being achieved, the work being done to eliminate child labor from the soccer ball industry in Pakistan. Two years ago, thousands of children under the age of 14 worked for 50 companies stitching soccer balls full-time. The industry, the ILO and UNICEF joined together to remove children from the production of soccer balls and give them a chance to go to school, and to monitor the results. Today, the work has been taken up by women in 80 poor villages in Pakistan, giving them new employment and their families new stabilities. Meanwhile, the children have started to go to school, so that when they come of age they will be able to do better jobs raising the standard of living of their families, their villages and their nation. I thank all who were involved in this endeavor and ask others to follow their lead.' (Clinton 1999) To sum up, an effect of institutional entrepreneurship in Sialkot was to adversely affect the sense of well-being of women stitchers. It is highly doubtful if the women stitchers would have recognized themselves as those described by Bill Clinton: recall that only 20% of the pre-project female stitching workforce took up, or felt compelled to accept, the offer of 'new stability'. Even the study undertaken by Save the Children (2000a) in 12 villages with monitorable stitching centres, in which 3,210 households were interviewed, found that nearly all stitchers preferred the old regime to the new one. Home-based stitching was found to be more convenient and less humiliating. This finding illustrates our earlier point that whether this case of institutional entrepreneurship is characterized as a 'success' will depend upon the perspective from which it is written and interpreted. We discuss this in the next section.
Khan et al.: A Dark Side of Institutional Entrepreneurship

Discussion
When we set out to study the de-institutionalization of child labour in the soccer-ball manufacturing industry and the institutionalization of factory-base production, we assumed that removing the scourge of child labour was the most important feature of the change. It soon became apparent, however, that this instance of institutional entrepreneurship had had significant unintended consequences. These, in turn, led us to reflect upon possible unacknowledged conditions that contributed to the framing of the issue as one of child labour rather than, say, poverty wages. In exploring these conditions and consequences, and the absence of the latter in official narratives, we were struck by how the ramifications of the change seemed to be of so little concern to anyone except members of the stitching community. Whether the stitchers approved of the means through which the 'problem' was solved or whether they welcomed the new practices was apparently of little interest to the companies and most of the NGOs. What mattered, it seemed, was that the sensibilities of western consumers had been soothed, as the reputation of the branded balls was restored; that the NGOs had played their soothing role without raising awkward questions; and that manufacture of the balls would be uninterrupted so that the entertainment industry could be supplied, and damage to industry's profits averted. The Sialkot case was, and remains, celebrated as a highly effective example of corporate social responsibility, with credit given to the institutions who cooperated to ensure the speedy removal of this abuse of human rights.
What first appeared as an institutional project to eradicate certain selfevidently bad practices, we subsequently reinterpreted as an entrepreneurial move to restore Sialkot as a critical part of the wider field of soccer-ball production, sales and profits. In institutionalist terms, the brands on the soccer balls, not the child stitchers, were the primary objects of reform and restitution. Balls bearing global brand names, which had been selling in the West for decades, had become 'tainted'. An effective means had to be found for purifying or re-legitimizing the balls, and thus the brands, in the eyes of western consumers whose consciences had been pricked by the CBS documentary. Unacknowledged were the unintended consequences associated with the successful implementation of this objective -notably, loss of income, disruption to family life and the negative effects upon women, in particular. These effects were either disregarded by, or invisible to, the NGOs, the industry or western media, who seemingly had eyes only for the child labourers.
An account of the Sialkot case as a triumph of entrepreneurship in the form of exemplary responsiveness, leadership and cooperation between the various parties resonates with institutional analysis in which power is conceived as a possession of change agents. Incorporating an actor-centric conception of power into institutional analysis may appear to make it more 'savvy', or even more 'radical', than alternatives that pay scant attention to power. But in doing so, it can become complicit in legitimizing and reproducing the status quo. This is because a way of seeing the positive actions of the entrepreneurs is simultaneously a way of not seeing the postcolonial conditions and impoverishing consequences of their intervention (Poggi 1965) . What is not seen in conventional approaches is the manner in which power operates hegemonically to identify agents' 'interests' and to represent and normalize practices in a particular way. This is particularly the case in 'postcolonial' settings, where the values of the colonial power are routinely privileged in framing, interpreting and addressing the issue of child labour. The members of the coalition, especially the NGOs, can be seen as the postcolonial equivalents of agents of a colonial power overseeing the needs (e.g. the need to eradicate child labour) of its 'obviously deficient' subjects (cf. Lane 1993) .
The hegemonic operation of power is sustained by drawing a 'velvet curtain' between an audience and the 'entrepreneurs', rendering full consequences of the latter's actions invisible. In our case, it was imposed between the buyers of branded soccer balls in the West and the consequences of campaign in Sialkot. Unlike its 'iron' equivalent, the velvet curtain operates silently and almost invisibly, and not by brandishing the coercive 'fist' of military might. As the curtain is drawn, one set of actors -the postcolonial stitching families -in the field is divided from, and subordinated to, another set of actors -the users of branded soccer balls -in a way that is seemingly entirely normal and 'proper'. At the same time, knowledge of the unintended consequences of the coalition's entrepreneurship is prevented from extending beyond the confines of the community of stitchers to the media and the purchasers of (branded) soccer balls. In this way, consumers who had been rendered uncomfortable by tales of children stitching their balls and who were eager to be convinced that their balls had been sufficiently cleansed, were reassured that their normal, carefree purchase could be resumed.
The operation of power that draws velvet curtains relies upon a naturalization of the asymmetrical distribution of material and symbolic resources. The stitchers lacked access to legal/political, cultural and economic resources; and, to our knowledge, no attempt was made by NGOs, for example, to attenuate this situation. The 'foreigners' could fly into Sialkot, but representatives of the stitchers could not readily travel to the ILO offices in Geneva to convey their concerns and grievances. Communications were conducted in English and little or no effort was made to inform the stitchers of the international controversy and the nature of the response being prepared. Lacking any significant capital, symbolic or material, the illiterate stitchers were handicapped in gaining access to, let alone becoming involved in, agenda-setting processes and negotiations over their fate.
In considering the development of the coalition between the companies that organized the production of the soccer balls, the industry association and the NGOs, such as UNICEF and ILO, as an instance of institutional entrepreneurship, we have noted how the formation and effective intervention of the coalition is, according to an actor-centric conception of power, attributable to the actors who organized its formation and maintenance. However, constructing a narrative of change upon an actor-centric conception of power has the effect of 'defocalizing' -to deploy DiMaggio's (1988) terminology against his plea for attention to be paid to 'interest and agency ' (DiMaggio 1988: 3) -the operation of 'preconscious understandings', which, from a different perspective, can be interpreted as stubborn social residues of 'class', 'gender', 'postcolonialism', etc. It is these potent residues that underpin the credibility that is attached to the press statements issued by companies; that marginalize consideration of the impact of the intervention upon women stitchers; and that lend support to the role of the NGOs, which are endowed with a reputation that can provide companies with the legitimacy they lack. Conversely, an actor-centric analysis tends to incorporate and legitimize the notion that the stitchers were rendered powerless by irrational, pre-modern forces (rather than by the legacy of postcolonialism and/or the relentless sequestration of global capitalism). Moreover, analysis informed by an actor-centric conception of power readily lends support to an interpretation (and denigration) of other forms of analysis as 'politically' motivated while implying that its own conceptualization of power does not itself articulate a (conservative) power/knowledge framework.
An actor-centric view of power is silent on what, from an alternative, hegemonic perspective, is most significant: namely, the investment of power in discourses -of 'class', 'gender', 'postcolonialism', etc. In our study, the discourse of class represented the issue of child labour as a legal matter for the government of Pakistan, not a responsibility of US companies; it ensured the exclusion of stitchers from participating in determining the nature of the reforms; and it also served to normalize the change from home-based to factory-based production which, in Marxian terms, facilitated the 'real' subordination of labour by removing familial constraints upon its 'rational' organization. The discourse of gender excluded consideration of the consequences of the reforms for women who, arguably, were most adversely affected by the institutional entrepreneurship pursued by the coalition. Either they faced the humiliation of working at the stitching centres, which also meant losing the benefits of the flexibility of working at home, or they continued working at home on an illegal and precarious basis where they were at the mercy of unscrupulous subcontractors. Finally, the discourse of postcolonialism supported the treatment of the stitchers as subalterns who struggled to be heard (see Spivak 1999) . The NGOs could provide information that would be trusted by the western media, and it was this that inhibited comparison of the dominant, success narrative with the perceptions of the stitchers whose existence and struggle was screened by the curtain. The role of the NGOs as 'honest brokers' rendered superfluous any need to pay direct attention to the other, and thus effectively muted the articulation of an alternative narrative in which attention might be drawn to the adverse consequences of seemingly benign actions.
Conclusion
Rather than being an exception, our case of institutional entrepreneurship in Sialkot has parallels in a range of instances, from the introduction of 'genderequity' to local organizations, to the institutionalisation of 'democratic government'. It has direct relevance for contemporary world events, as it connects with the growth and influx of western multinationals and the role of multilateral agencies (e.g. the World Bank or IMF) and international bodies, such as the WTO and ILO, as well as NGOs, in incentivizing and pressurizing the adoption of new practices and belief systems in developing, postcolonial societies. As capital chases cheap supplies of labour around the globe, the majority of the world's population living in developing countries finds itself under scrutiny with regard to 'legitimate' ways of doing things. Simply by appealing to what is taken to be unequivocally progressive, to justify imposing a particular set of practices, may produce quick, purifying results (e.g. removal of child labour), but it may also, and indeed is likely to, generate unintended consequences that are less flattering to its champions. In Sialkot, the system of monitored workshops was introduced not through a display of military might but with a discourse of enlightened employment practice, legitimized by NGOs, which communicated to western consumers that the interests or 'rights' ascribed to the children were guiding the change process and establishing work practices as they 'ought' to be. We found that this discourse took scant account of concerns expressed to be of central importance to stitching families (e.g. living wages and the right to work in the privacy of homes).
In focusing upon the darker side of institutional entrepreneurship, we have resisted and challenged a tendency, within analyses of institutionalization and deinstitutionalization, to exclude 'power' as a relevant concept or to assume that it is a possession employed episodically by agents (e.g. entrepreneurs) to secure their interests despite resistance from other agents who are shown to be less powerful. Conceiving power as possessed, in smaller or larger measure, by actors, leads to an account where, in the Sialkot case, a coalition of institutional entrepreneurs is seen to have overcome established working practices involving child labour despite opposition from ball stitchers. A narrative is produced that is dominated by the activities of the (heroic) agents of change to whom sufficient power is attributed to accomplish their mission. This sort of approach relies implicitly upon an elite standpoint that de-focalizes other possible ways of representing the phenomenon.
The problem, as we have formulated it, however, is not so much that it ends up having blind spots, as Adler and Jermier (2005) contend. The metaphor of a 'blind spot' is unsupportable because it presumes (i) an omniscient vantage point from which such spots can be identified; and (ii) the possibility of developing an approach that can overcome the perspectival nature of our knowledge. Rather, what is at issue, we suggest, is how a certain, actor-centric perspective is routinely and unselfconsciously privileged and performed so that, for example, the conditions of action are unacknowledged and scant attention is paid to unintended consequences.
When, in contrast, power is conceived as operating hegemonically, attention is focused upon the taken-for-grantedness of the moral necessity and associated legitimacy of the values and practices that, in the Sialkot case, enabled the successful transfer and application of a particular, western institutional template, concerning the unacceptability (indeed, illegality) of child labour, to the world of soccer ball production in Pakistan. The orientation of the coalition towards stitchers, we have suggested, is symptomatic of a postcolonial legacy as well as the reproduction of relations of class and gender in respect of the exploitative, patronizing and demeaning treatment of the stitchers, and especially the women stitchers.
In problematizing a seemingly benign template, there is clearly a risk that our study will be read as an apology for child labour. We do not condone the involvement of children in the stitching of soccer balls, but we invite reflection upon the motives that prompted efforts to remove it and the consequences of shifting production from the domestic sphere into factory sheds. We hope that our study will prompt the development of similar analyses of the conditions, as well as the consequences, of institutional entrepreneurship, including studies that pay close attention to how agencies involved in globalized manufacturing prosper as the knock-on effects of its ostensibly enlightened interventions are disregarded
We have invoked the metaphor of the 'velvet curtain' to point to how disinterest in unintended consequences becomes institutionalized, as awareness of certain outcomes is routinely screened from awareness. In exploring this darker side of institutional entrepreneurship, our analysis has pointed to limits of studies that are either silent about power or conceptualize it in a way that screens this darker side from view. That said, we have not advocated the abandonment of established, actor-centric forms of analysis or urged their replacement by studies informed by an alternative, hegemonic conception of power. Indeed, our approach is founded upon agnosticism about what power 'really is'. Instead of seeking either to offer an incremental improvement upon an existing body of knowledge or commending a substitute approach, we have emphasized how a condition of our account of the darker side of institutional entrepreneurship is the privileging of a particular conception of power.
Our approach invites institutional theorists to appreciate the role of power in the reproduction of relations of domination as they are articulated inter alia in relations of 'class', 'gender' and 'postcolonialism' -all of which we see woven into the fabric of the 'velvet curtain'. It encourages future researchers to pay close attention to how these relations are implicated in how institutions lose or gain legitimacy. It also urges closer attention to be paid to voices that are routinely unheard as well as to vocal advocates and opponents of institutional innovation. Our hope is to have shown how a more extensive and reflective consideration of power can be of value for illuminating what, routinely if inadvertently, is thrown into shadow by much institutionalist analysis.
